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State v. Smith, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 3, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: INVOLUNTARY PLEA 
 
Summary 
 
Defendant Terrance Reed Smith entered a no contest plea to one count of child abuse 
resulting in substantial bodily harm. The Supreme Court of Nevada held Smith’s plea was 
involuntary because the plea was made in response to acts of coercion by the Washoe County 
Department of Social Services (“DDS”). 
 
Background 
 
Smith was alleged to have committed an act of child abuse upon his infant daughter. DDS 
sought and obtained custody of Smith’s daughter and placed her in foster care. DDS indicated it 
would consent to returning physical and legal custody of Smith’s daughter to his wife, on the 
condition that he was incarcerated on child abuse charges. Smith subsequently entered a no 
contest plea to one count of child abuse resulting in substantial bodily harm and was sentenced to 
prison. As agreed, after Smith was sentenced to prison, DDS returned legal and physical custody 
of the infant to Smith’s wife. Smith filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging he should be allowed to withdraw his plea as it was coerced and involuntary. The 
district court granted the petition and the State of Nevada (“the State”) appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 On appeal, the State first contended the district court ignored important facts pertaining to 
Smith’s behavior and compliance with DSS. The Court held that the identifying and weighing of 
facts is a province of the district court2 and there is nothing in the record to suggest the district 
court ignored the evidence presented to it.  
 
 The State further argued the plea was not coerced because it was motivated by a desire to 
avoid a more serious consequence. The Court dismissed this argument finding Smith did not 
enter the plea to avoid a greater charge and the plea was motivated by the unique circumstances 
of DDS’s position on the family court case. 
 
 Lastly, citing Iaea3, the State argued nothing about DSS’s actions were unconstitutional, 
and constitutional, lawful actions of an agency cannot amount to coercion. The Court, relying 
upon Iaea, found that the voluntariness of a plea in the context of coercion is based on the 
totality of the circumstances. The Court explained the concern is not solely about the subjective 
state of mind of the defendant, but also the “constitutional acceptability of the external forces 
inducing the guilty plea.”4 Finding that external forces induced the plea does not relate to the 
constitutionality of the external forces in isolation, but instead relates to whether the external 
                                                        
1  By Jessie Vargas. 
2  Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 634, 367–98 (1986). 
3  Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986). 
4  Id. at 866. 
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forces deprived the plea of voluntariness. In finding the incarceration condition coercive, the 
Court determined Iaea suggests that agency actions that may be lawful and constitutional, can 
nevertheless be unduly coercive. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Even legal and constitutional actions, if unduly coercive, render a plea involuntary. Thus, 
the district court’s finding that Smith’s incarceration condition proposed by DSS was unduly 
coercive was not an abuse of discretion. 
